Throughout much of his long life, Kenneth Burke was recognized as a leading American intellectual, perhaps the most significant critic writing in English since Coleridge. From about 1950 on, rhetoricians in both English and speech began to see him as a major contributor to the New Rhetoric. But despite Burke's own claims to be writing philosophy and some notice from reviewers and critics that his work was philosophically significant, Timothy W. Crusius is the first to access his work as (...) philosophy. Crusius traces Burke's commitment and contributions to philosophy prior to 1945, from Counter-Statement through The Philosophy of Literary Form. While Burke might have been a late modernist thinker, Crusius shows that Burke actually starts from a position closely akin to such postmodern figures as Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty. Crusius then examines Burke's work from A Grammar of Motives up to his last published essays, drawing most heavily on A Rhetoric of Motives, The Rhetoric of Religion, and uncollected essays from the 1970s. This part concerns Burke's contributions to human activities always closely associated with rhetoric-hermeneutics, dialectic, and praxis. Burke's highly developed notion of our species as the "symbol-using animal," argues Crusius, draws together the various strands of his later philosophy—his concern with interpretation, with dialectic and dialogue, with a praxis devoted to awareness and control of the self-deceiving and potentially self-destructive motives inherent in language itself. (shrink)

Originally published in English in 1980, _Rhetoric as Philosophy _has been out of print for some time. The reviews of that English edition attest to the importance of Ernesto Grassi’s work. By going back to the Italian humanist tradition and aspects of earlier Greek and Latin thought, Ernesto Grassi develops a conception of rhetoric as the basis of philosophy. Grassi explores the sense in which the first principles of rational thought come from the metaphorical power of the word. He finds (...) the basis for his conception in the last great thinker of the Italian humanist tradition, Giambattista Vico. He concentrates on Vico’s understanding of imagination and the sense of human ingenuity contained in metaphor. For Grassi, rhetorical activity is the essence and inner life of thought when connected to the metaphorical power of the word. (shrink)

This study investigates the relations between narrative experiences and film enjoyment, and explores the possibility that transportability and perceived realism facilitate narrative experience and indirectly influence enjoyment. The study measured narrative experience and realism in three films from different genres. Results demonstrate that transportability, and both external realism and narrative realism positively influence at least one aspect of narrative experience, and that narrative experience in turn is a significant predictor for enjoyment.

Żyjemy w czasach cywilizacyjnego przełomu. Ludzka aktywność skierowana na podporządkowanie sobie środowiska naturalnego doprowadziła do jego dewastacji, niosącej katastrofalne skutki dla dalszego trwania ludzkości. Naukowe prognozy, publikowane od października 2018 roku, ukazują realne zagrożenie globalną katastrofą klimatyczną w najbliższych latach jako oczywisty scenariusz w przypadku niepodjęcia skutecznej próby przeciwdziałania zagrożeniu. Powstrzymanie katastrofy staje się coraz trudniejszym zadaniem dla społeczności ludzi obecnie żyjących. Artykuł koncentruje się na zagadnieniu reakcji na wspomniany kryzys w dyskursie filozoficznym. W świetle przeprowadzonej analizy wiele wskazuje na (...) to, że w filozofii współczesnej zagrożenie globalną katastrofą nie wywołuje wyraźnej reakcji jej przedstawicieli. Przeprowadzona analiza zmierza do ukazania przyczyn tego stanu rzeczy. -------------------------- Zgłoszono: 24/11/2022. Zrecenzowano: 27/02/2023. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 24/04/2023. (shrink)

Experiential evidence shows that pain is associated with common meanings. These include a meaning of threat or danger, which is experienced as immediately distressing or unpleasant; cognitive meanings, which are focused on the long-term consequences of having chronic pain; and existential meanings such as hopelessness, which are more about the person with chronic pain than the pain itself. This interdisciplinary book - the second in the three-volume Meanings of Pain series edited by Dr Simon van Rysewyk - aims to better (...) understand pain by describing experiences of pain and the meanings these experiences hold for the people living through them. The lived experiences of pain described here involve various types of chronic pain, including spinal pain, labour pain, rheumatic pain, diabetic peripheral neuropathic pain, fibromyalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, endometriosis-associated pain, and cancer-related pain. Two chapters provide narrative descriptions of pain, recounted and interpreted by people with pain. Language is important to understanding the meaning of pain since it is the primary tool human beings use to manipulate meaning. As discussed in the book, linguistic meaning may hold clues to understanding some pain-related experiences, including the stigmatisation of people with pain, the dynamics of patient-clinician communication, and other issues, such as relationships between pain, public policy and the law, and attempts to develop a taxonomy of pain that is meaningful for patients. Clinical implications are described in each chapter. This book is intended for people with pain, their family members or caregivers, clinicians, researchers, advocates, and policy makers. (shrink)

Publikowana od 2018 roku seria raportów Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) zradykalizowała oceny, dotyczące realności katastrofy klimatycznej, zagrażającej Ziemi – katastrofy, wywołanej przez rabunkową eksploatację zasobów paliw kopalnych. Wprowadziła nową jakość w obszar debaty publicznej i polityki klimatycznej. Efektem tego stały się podjęte przez Parlament Europejski szerokie regulacje prawne, służące powstrzymywaniu katastrofy, określone jako Zielony Ład. Regulacje te wywołały szereg napięć i konfliktów. W artykule podjęta została próba analizy skutków tych konfliktów dla dalszej walki z globalnym ociepleniem i zagrożeniem (...) katastrofą klimatyczną. Analiza przebiegu i prawdopodobnych skutków konfliktów pozwala na stwierdzenie, że odgrywają one destrukcyjną rolę dla dalszego rozwoju wydarzeń. Powodują wzrost dążenia do obrony zagrożonych interesów, a tym samym utrwalanie dotychczasowych podziałów. Czynnikiem wzmacniającym negatywne tendencje stała się wojna w Ukrainie, powodująca wzrost kosztów utrzymania w krajach Unii Europejskiej. Sumowanie się kosztów Zielonego Ładu i wojny powoduje wzrost niechęci do polityki ekologicznej, a jej przymusowy charakter rodzi pytania o efektywność i skuteczność. --------------------------------------- Zgłoszono: 30/04/2024. Zrecenzowano: 27/06/2024. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 29/07/2024. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of Susan Haack’s philosophy of law and points out several aspects within the legal pragmatist tradition that deserve further discussion. Firstly, a systematic presentation of legal pragmatism as it is defended by Haack, who follows Justice Oliver W. Holmes here, is given. Secondly, the limits of an evolutionary perspective of law recommended by legal pragmatism are considered. Finally, the paper discusses whether legal pragmatism is able to handle different legal traditions, thereby focusing on Anglo-American common (...) law and European civil law. (shrink)

Kant’s introduction in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV) of a spontaneity proper to the understanding is often thought to be one of the central innovations of his Critical philosophy. As I show in this paper, however, a number of thinkers within the 18th century German tradition in the time before the KrV (including the pre-Critical Kant himself) had already developed a robust conception of the spontaneity of the mind, a conception which, in many respects lays the groundwork for Kant’s (...) later, rather more influential account. To illustrate this, I consider three accounts of the spontaneity of the mind—those of Crusius, the pre-Critical Kant, and Tetens—which, while distinct, nonetheless relate to and explicitly draw upon one another in important ways, forming as it were the interconnected and, thus far, largely overlooked pre-Critical context for Kant’s discussion of the spontaneity of the understanding in the KrV. As I conclude, while Kant’s own account of the spontaneity of the understanding, and particularly of the I think clearly departs from these accounts, it nonetheless continues to connect in significant ways with the trailblazing discussions of his immediate predecessors. (shrink)

Paley, in his note on Eur. Hel. 1301, says, ‘The choral ode which here follows, though beautiful in itself, is liable to the charge of being unconnected with the subject of the play.’ He adds that the ode ‘is both difficult and corrupt.’ And as far as I am aware, no one has yet succeeded in explaining away the difficulties, or restoring the more corrupt sentences.

Kant was not a very knowledgeable historian of philosophy. He came to the study of philosophy from natural science, and later the fields of ethics, aesthetics, politics and religion came to occupy his central concerns, but his approach to philosophical issues never came by way of reflection on their history. He was well acquainted, of course, with the recent tradition of German philosophy: Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten and Crusius, and he seems also to have had knowledge of eighteenth century French (...) philosophy, and of as much of Anglophone philosophy as had been translated into either French or German. But like many modern philosophers, he had an inadequate appreciation of the scholastic tradition, and his knowledge of classical Greek philosophy was mostly at second hand. (shrink)

In what follows, I will detail Kant's criticism of the Leibnizian conception of mind as it is presented in key chapters of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft . Approaching Kant with such a focus goes against the current predominant in contemporary Kant scholarship. Kant's engagement with Leibniz in the KrV is often taken as limited to the refutation of the latter's relational theory of space and time in the Aesthetic and the general criticism presented in the Amphiboly chapter, inasmuch as (...) Kant is taken to be primarily concerned with addressing empiricist opponents (a focus particularly evident in the English-language commentary). In addition, the argument against rational psychology in the Paralogisms is taken as challenging an essentially Cartesian position. The first two chapters of this project will introduce the Leibnizian conception of the mind, contrasting it with its Cartesian predecessor, and consider the career of the Leibnizian conception in the schools of 18th century Germany. As I will show, it was the Leibnizian conception of mind that held sway, despite scattered challenges, and that would have primarily been on Kant's mind when he turned to consider the extravagant claims of metaphysical psychology. In chapters 3-5, I turn to Kant's criticism of this conception as presented in the Transcendental Analytic of the KrV . There, I show how the subjective and objective deductions, in addition to the Amphiboly chapter, all address the Leibnizian claim of a parallelism between the investigations of the mental and the physical. In chapters 6-8, I consider the case against the Leibnizian conception of mind as presented in the Transcendental Dialectic, claiming that the doctrine of transcendental illusion plays an important (though largely ignored) role in explaining the grounds of the Leibnizian conception as it is transmitted in the rational psychology of Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Kant himself in the 1770's. Moreover, I argue that the limits Kant sets to empirical psychology are consistent with his criticism of the Leibnizian conception of mind, and, significantly, are motivated by deeper practical concerns. (shrink)

This paper is the second part of the investigation. Chr. A. Crusius in the “Way to the Certainty and Adequacy of Human Knowledge” introduced the most developed alternative view to Wolffian position regarding symbolic and contemplating correlation. He preferred the contemplating cognition and tied its functioning with imagination. Kant in the “Critique of Pure Reason” brings about a terminology revolution and changes the style of the problem consideration. He turns the proceeding from F. Viet and G.W. Leibniz’s art “speciosa (...) generalis”, which was earlier thought as symbolic, into a priori figurative synthesis. Following the changes in the nature of sensibility and understanding treatment, Kant rejects the opposition of intuitive or contemplative and symbolic in favour of the following oppositions: intuitive is opposed to discursive, while the contemplation is opposed to the understanding concept. The figurative synthesis as a result of transcendental faculty of imagination instead of the former empirical imagery creates the schematic possibility of the empirical image per se. This well-developed Kant’s position unwittingly put aside Wolff’s program of reduction of the symbolic cognition to quasi-intuitive one. However, today this program can have a practical importance and enrich the problem of the cognition visibility. (shrink)

The article describes the importance of public performance for the image of the Futurists, mainly of Bruno Jasieński. The impressions that the artists gained from Helena Buczyńska’s ‘word-arts’ performance, and Scriabin’s idea of ‘Art Religion’ they were exposed to, inspired the young poets. The article finishes with enumeration of several inspirations that are being found in Jasieński’s texts by modern musicians adapting his poetry.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kenneth Burke on Dialectical-Rhetorical TranscendenceJames P. ZappenKenneth Burke's concept of rhetoric is complex and elusive, increasingly so as it becomes intertwined and infused with dialectic in the long third part of A Rhetoric of Motives and in some essays published shortly thereafter (1951; 1955; 1969b [1950], 183–333).1 The connection between Burke's rhetoric and dialectic is well established (Brummett 1995; Crusius 1986; 1999, 120–21; Wess 1996, 136–216; Wolin 2001, (...) 143–204), and his concept of rhetoric as identification is widely recognized for its broadening of the traditional view of rhetoric as persuasion to include identification as a means of inducing cooperation and building communities (Crusius 1999, 120–21; Hauser 1986, 120–37; Henderson 1988, 33–34). Timothy W. Crusius establishes the fundamental relationship between A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives as dialectical and rhetorical counterparts and explains both the strengths and the limitations of identification as a means of inducing cooperation (1986). According to Crusius, dialectic explores the substance of a person or thing—all that "supports or 'substands'" it—from multiple and shifting perspectives, viewing human action dramatistically as act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose (24–28). Rhetoric complements dialectic and its multiple dramatistic perspectives by promoting "identification" and "cooperation," building "a community, a sense of oneness amid diversity of conflicting interests and values" (28–30). As Crusius and others observe, [End Page 279] however, identification as a means of inducing cooperation is inherently limited since any identification necessarily also entails a division: "Every 'us' requires a 'them'" (29; Biesecker 1997, 47–49; Wolin 2001, 177–78). Thus, for example, while Christianity provides a powerful instance of identification, it also provides an equally powerful illustration of its division from other peoples—"Satan and his counter-kingdom," "the Turk infidel," and "the pagan hordes of Asia" (28–29). For Burke, these divisions were largely political (George and Selzer 2007, 16–57, 110–32; Lentricchia 1983, 21–38). For us, they are differences of gender, culture, and economic and social class (Condit 1992), compounded by political, economic, and religious differences on a global scale. By this account, the first two parts of the Rhetoric offer at best a partial solution to the problem. The third part challenges and mystifies and in itself seems to offer little more than a utopian vision without purpose or outcome (Crusius 1999, 120–21; Wess 1996, 211–16; Wolin 2001, 201–3).2 Situated within the broader context of Burke's work, however, the third part seems rather to offer a bold and creative solution to the problem by merging dialectic and rhetoric with dialogue and poetic myth in a dialectical-rhetorical transcendence—a concept that merits a place alongside identification as a major contribution to rhetorical theory (1969b, 197–208, 221–33).3Burke's concept of dialectical-rhetorical transcendence developed over the course of more than twenty years, from the mid 1930s to the mid 1950s and beyond. Its sources are partly Hegelian and Marxist but increasingly Platonic,4 as Burke comes to perceive the Hegelian and Marxist concepts of history as part of the problem of competing ideologies and his version of Platonic transcendence as the solution—a solution that leads, on the one hand, toward "pure persuasion" and "ultimate identification" and, on the other, toward the pragmatics of a new rhetoric and a revolutionary program of lifelong education (1951; 1955; 1969b, 267–94, 328–33; Biesecker 1997, 43–47; Lee 2004; Wess 1996, 203–5, 211–16; Wolin 2001, 201–3). In the midst of the political divisiveness of the 1930s, Burke glimpsed in Hegel and even Marx the possibility of bridging conflicting ideologies via transcendence, but he turned to Plato in the Grammar and again in the Rhetoric to explain the processes by which opposing ideas and ideologies might merge in transcendent visions or myths that encompass what he perceived to be partial and partisan points of view. In the Grammar, his solution is dialectical—a merger of opposing ideas at higher levels of generalization through a process of linguistic abstraction and transformation that respects a diversity of individual interests, even as it seeks to transcend them in larger [End... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humanism as Philosophia (Perennis):Grassi's Platonic Rhetoric between Gadamer and KristellerRocco RubiniToday's situation is such that in our desacralized and demythologized world we believe in no annunciations, in no purely directive statements, in no evangelist, be it a God or a prophet. We turn to rational thought, to proofs and reasons in order to free ourselves from the subjectivity and relativity of appearances.... Thus not only is every access to (...) religious sacred texts closed to us but so also is the possibility of a metaphysics, a science that tells us about the "essence of man" (Humanism).—Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as PhilosophyDonald P. Verene commemorated Ernesto Grassi by recognizing that his work allows for a fresh approach to Vico, Heidegger, Renaissance, and rhetorical studies (1996, 295–303). While Grassi's authority on Vico remains undisputed, examination of his relevance to other fields of study is still wanting. As for Martin Heidegger, his students have been too numerous and successful for Grassi to easily claim pride of place among them. In turn, as Verene notes, American Renaissance scholarship has failed to realize that Grassi's work represents a direct alternative to that of Paul Oskar Kristeller, another student of Heidegger. Kristeller's influential characterization of Renaissance [End Page 242] humanism as a rhetorical and thus, in his view, nonphilosophical tradition often causes Grassi to be simply dismissed.1 Finally, his reception in rhetorical studies remains problematic and limited in its own right.In his Foreword to the reprint of Grassi's Rhetoric as Philosophy (1980), Timothy W. Crusius clearly expresses the confused deference that has caused rhetoricians to steer clear of the "anomaly" Grassi represents. Crusius laments that scholars have not attempted to bring Grassi into conversation with partisans of rhetoric like Hans-Georg Gadamer and that very little attention has been paid to works such as The Primordial Metaphor (1994) or to the overall religious dimension of his thought. Crusius attributes this general neglect to the American rhetoricians' unfamiliarity with the Latin-humanist rhetorical tradition: Grassi, in direct opposition to Heidegger, would have fashioned his philosophy from Roman rather than Greek sources (2001, xiii–xviii).This essay closely narrates2 how Grassi's notions of metaphysics and "rhetoric" developed in his early writings in order to dispel some of the misconceptions that have prevented readers from entering what Grassi himself defines as the "originary tension" awakening his own and, indeed, any philosopher's concerns, interests, and pathos (1994, 5–6). For if Grassi often lamented Heidegger's philhellenism—an aversion to romanitas at which he and other "Latin" students such as José Ortega y Gasset took personal offense (1988, 347)—we shall see that his philosophy was originally grounded on a nontraditional reading of Greek sources. Indeed, a reader would be at pains to recover a sustained reading of Cicero or Quintilian in his entire corpus, while between 1932 and 1946 Grassi published three volumes dedicated to an original interpretation of Plato.3Whereas the following account might make Grassi's notion of "rhetoric as philosophy" even more idiosyncratic—originally founded neither on a recovery of Roman eloquence nor, as we shall see, on a rehabilitation of the Sophists—his early Platonism makes him conversant with Gadamer and provides insight into his religiosity. Grassi's distinctive Platonism also spurs consideration of his missed confrontation with Kristeller and of the mutual disregard between American Renaissance scholars and rhetoricians in the latter part of the twentieth century. The following pages place the reader in a position to appreciate the relevance of Grassi's work to current scholarship.Heidegger's Anti-Platonism and Recent Plato StudiesThe belated and ongoing publication of Heidegger's lectures prior to Being and Time (1927) has led us closer to the experience of his students and offered [End Page 243] clear insight into his preference for Aristotle over Plato. The WS 1924–25 lecture course on the Sophist—one of Heidegger's most sustained confrontations with Plato before his Plato's Doctrine of Truth (1942)—begins with the assertion "What Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically" (1997, 8). By developing... (shrink)

Kant scholars have rarely addressed the notion of optimism as it was interpreted by the Königsbergian philosopher in the mid-18th century. The notion originates from Leibniz’s Theodi­cy and from debates over whether the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. The first of a two-part series, this article studies the historical context in which appeared Kant’s 1759 lecture advertisement leaflet entitled An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism. The study describes the requirements of the 1755 Berlin Academy of (...) Sciences’ competition for a comparison of G. W. Leibniz’s and A. Pope’s systems and an assessment of optimism. Another focus is the philological difficulties of translating Pope’s proposition “Whatever is, is right” into the French language — which was part of the competition task. The author considers the ways the proposition was translated into the Russian and German languages. The article shows the contribution of Voltaire and his Poem on the Lisbon Disaster and Candide: or, Optimism to the post factum changes in the perception of the competition results and to the emergence of new shades of meaning in the concept of optimism. The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 had a profound effect on Europe and on the perception of optimism and of the idea that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. However, Kant’s epistolary legacy leads one to the conclusion that the philosopher examined the problem in the framework of a polemic on Crusian philosophy. This article presents Crusius’s arguments against the theory that this is the best of all possible worlds and in favour of the theory that there are several good worlds. God’s choice of the actual world owes therefore to the freedom of contradiction (libertas contradictionis) and to the freedom of contrariety (libertas contrarietatis), which are eliminated in the teaching of optimism. (shrink)

Artykuł stara się podać argumenty za hipotezą, że pijar litewski ks. Kazimierz Narbutt był filozofem, który miał zaszczyt jako pierwszy na wschodzie, a być może w całej Europie, krytykować przedkrytyczne poglądy Immanuela Kanta. W 1765 roku, w swoim wykładzie filozofii w Kolegium Pijarów w Dąbrowicy Narbut krytykuje pojęcie substancji zaproponowane przez „metafizyka Cantziusa”. Osobą wskazaną jako „Cantzius” mógł być albo Immanuel Kant, albo teolog Gottlieb Izrael Canz. W artykule zostały podane dwa argumenty dotyczące stanowiska Steponasa Tunaitisa: osobą, która została określona (...) przez Narbuta, nie mógł być Canz, ponieważ wyrażany przez niego pogląd był reprezentatywny dla teologii Wolffiańskiej. To stanowisko filozoficzne było zbliżone do samego Narbuta, jego koncepcja istoty substancji jest taka sama, jak szkoły Wolffa. Canz nie mógł dostarczyć pojęcia substancji, które byłoby sprzeczne z poglądem szkoły Wolffa. Drugi argument, odnosi się do głównej tezy Kanta zawartej w jego pracy z 1755 pt. Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidato można przypisać „metafizykowi Cantziusowi” jeśli chodzi o istotę, atrybuty i cele Boga, które zostały zakwestionowane przez Narbuta. To jednocześnie pozwala nam uznać, że Narbut zapoznał się bezpośrednio lub pośrednio z wyżej wymienionym dziełem Kanta. Osoba, o której mowa w tekście Narbuta, to nikt oprócz Kanta, który zajmował się w tym czasie zagadnieniami metafizycznymi. (shrink)

THE PROBLEM OF THE INTERPRETATION OF HAMANN Johann Georg Hamann is an intriguing but poorly known figure in the contemporary intellectual world. Yet this is the man whom Kierkegaard saluted as "Emperor!", whose writings were to have been arranged for publication by none other than Goethe himself, and whom Dilthey numbered among the primordial figures in the rise of modern historical consciousness. There are reasons for the persistence of this general ignorance. Hamann is deep. And, in addition, there is his (...) forbidding style. The readers of Kierkegaard and Dilthey, two other giants who them selves achieved late recognition, have not had to face this kind of imposing obstacle. Not only does Hamann expect his readers to handle themselves in deep water, but to intuit their way between his ideas which bob up like islands with no visible connection between them. Like Kierkegaard too, Hamann has had his troubles with the public. He himself referred to the hope that he would be understood by a "better posterity". In fact only the last few years have seen the printing of some of his more controversial writings, in particular his theories on the nature of human sexuality. (shrink)

A non-epistemological history of historical epistemology Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9501-5 Authors W. R. Albury, School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

At his death in 1987, Paul W. Pruyser of the Menninger Foundation was widely recognized as one of America's foremost authorities on the psychology of religion. His book A Dynamic Psychology of Religion set the stage for creative dialogue on the subject. In this volume, two leading practitioners in the field present a compilation of Pruyser's seminal articles, providing an overview of the major themes in Pruyser's thought. Newton Malony and Bernard Spilka evaluate Pruyser's viewpoint and suggest how his position (...) continues to influence the psychology of religion. (shrink)

Introduction, W G Runciman Social Evolution in Primates: The Role of Ecological Factors and Male Behaviour, Carel P van Schaik Determinants of Group Size in Primates: A General Model, R I M Dunbar Function and Intention in the Calls of Non-Human Primates, Dorothy L Cheney & Robert M Seyfarth Why Culture is Common, but Cultural Evolution is Rare, Robert Boyd & Peter J Richerson An Evolutionary and Chronological Framework for Human Social Behaviour, Robert A Foley Friendship and the Banker?s Paradox: (...) Other Pathways to the Evolution of Adaptations for Altruism, John Tooby & Leda Cosmides The Early Prehistory of Human Social Behaviour: Issues of Archaeological Inference and Cognitive Evolution, Steven Mithen The Emergence of Biologically Modern Populations in Europe: A Social and Cognitive ?Revolution??, Paul Mellars Responses to Environmental Novelty: Changes in Men?s Marriage Strategies in a Rural Kenyan Community, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder Genetic Language Impairment: Unruly Grammars, M Gopnik, J Dalalakis, S E Fukuda, S Fukuda & E Kehayia The Emergence of Cultures among Wild Chimpanzees, Christophe Boesch Terrestriality, Bipedalism and the Origin of Language, Leslie C Aiello Conclusions, John Maynard Smith. (shrink)

Este artigo narra os encontros de jovens periféricos na Praça do Final da Linha, localizada no bairro de Sapiranga, em Fortaleza. Exploramos a praça como um espaço multifacetado e multifuncional, que desempenha diversos papéis essenciais na comunidade, servindo como escritório, palco e local de louvor. Entre 2019 e 2020, diferentes coletivos juvenis e jovens moradores das comunidades do bairro passaram a ocupar a praça, realizando feiras, exibições de filmes, cursos de empreendedorismo e o festival Sapiranga Sound System, entre outras atividades. (...) Essas iniciativas projetaram artistas locais e foram vinculadas ao debate sobre questões de classe, etnia, gênero e sexualidade. A arte emergiu como a alternativa encontrada por esses jovens para enfrentar desafios como a violência, a ausência de políticas públicas e a vulnerabilidade econômica. (shrink)

W. I. Matson; VIII—Against Induction and Empiricism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 143–158, https://doi.org/10.

In Search of a Political Philosophy is an analysis of the three democratic `isms'--conservatism, liberalism, and socialism--and of the distinct nature of the all-consuming ideology of Marxist communism. W. J. Stankiewicz is concerned with the conscious and unconscious assumptions of the proponents and followers of each ideology, and those of their theoreticians and critics. Stankiewicz examines the norms by which political ideologies are characterized, and discusses which of these are given precedence. He provides an analysis of how each ideology views (...) such issues as freedom and restraint, responsibility, equality, justice, power, authority, property, human nature and happiness. He also examines the areas of ideological contiguity and mutual influences, the sources of ideological incomprehension in our society, and the forces that split Western societies. In Search of a Political Philosophy takes issue with the positions of some of our leading political theorists and represents an original contribution to political philosophy in its own right. It makes a stimulating and challenging contribution to the areas of politics, political philosophy, ethics, political and social theory, the history of political thought, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

The idea of organism, which of recent years has bulked so largely in scientific, and especially in biological, theory has been developed mainly in reference to living organisms, and has been extended to cover such systems as human societies, crystals, molecules and atoms—and indeed the whole universe has been interpreted as an organism. This use of the term, however, includes different ways in which parts may be together in a system. The belief that the principle of organism has been wrongly (...) extended to explain certain co-ordinations of vital processes which require a different type of explanation is the reason for this addition to the immense literature on the subject of organism. (shrink)